Sovereignty is arguably neither popular nor conventional nor does it transpose itself into discourses of rule-making beyond the Nation State. For some, to speak of sovereignty in the context of global governance leads to bewildering identification of a 'global sovereign'. The multi-directional nature of the global reach and effects of EU law has been shown in this account to comprise boundaries and competences extensions to various degrees. It is argued to constitute manifestations of sovereignty, with spatial, action and transboundary dimensions to it that require 'unpacking'. This paper argues that postnational rule-making practices conducted by the EU may usefully be captured by sovereignty, as an over-arching framework beyond an analysis for power, influence and interactions between legal orders. Much scholarship on sovereignty and the EU has been developed prior to more recent invocations in the EU treaties to evolve as a postnational democracy. Participation by the EU in the global legal order is a multi-faceted construct but is argued here to be rooted in an understanding of the EU as an actor, i.e. what it is and what it does. Legal scholarship appears to place a high premium on the ability of the EU to participate externally as an actor, seamlessly, coherently and with consistency. Accordingly, as has been argued here, the enabling character of sovereignty at the postnational level appears insufficiently studied. The physical and metaphysical space of EU rules is argued here to require more nuancing, method and study as to its components. There are as many methodological as substantive challenges to such a thesis, which this text has sought to address as part of a research agenda. Legal texts providing for active participation in the global legal order can be most imperfect even in integrated spheres of action. What is more pressing to consider is the merger of sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction in a global world as an emerging matter for EU law.
Introduction
How the EU impacts, effects, participates and interacts in and with the global legal order presents many challenges for orthodoxy. One of the greatest challenges that it presents as a leading postnational democracy is argued here to be for our understanding of sovereignty. Accounts which depict or describe the EU as a postnational actor do not tend to invoke sovereignty, neither as a construct nor as a method or process thereof. Instead, such accounts are more concerned with the place within breakdowns of orthodoxy conceived broadly, the shortcomings of postnational democracy and its institutional components and rule-making practices. And there are many accounts in legal scholarship as to how the EU has evolved as an international actor, particularly after its last Treaty revision process. 1 Such accounts suggest that the EU plays an 'active role in shaping the international order', 2 in terms of its objectives and practices and many policies, but it is similarly not a discourse mediated through sovereignty. The EU's participation in the global legal order is argued to show manifestations of 'late sovereignty', or at least be atypical of postnational sovereignty. 3 It has spatial, action and transboundary dimensions to it that require unpacking. Sovereignty is arguably neither popular nor conventional nor does it transpose itself into discourses of rule-making beyond the Nation State. For some, to speak of sovereignty in the context of global governance leads to bewildering identification of a 'global sovereign'. International relations 'constructivists'
emphasise that sovereignty in its internal and external facets is a socially-constructed trait. 4 They are social facts that are usually produced and reproduced through the practices of States. Sovereignty comes from 'some place' and is heavily influenced by other social norms and practices. One of the most appealing and useful features of sovereignty for understanding the EU's actions in the world is that the EU, similar to sovereignty itself, has both an internal and external dimension.
As Keohane states, a means to interpret the essence of sovereignty is to view it as a thesis about norms of sovereignty being possibly violated. 5 Social norms are conventionally depicted as shared 1 See Steven Blockmans, Bart van Vooren, and Jan Wouters (eds. expectations on the part of a group about appropriate behaviour. 6 In the Nation State context, when norms are espoused they may not make a difference but they are important sources of behaviour in world politics. Norms do not per se determine behaviour but they exercise an impact. However, for norms to be relevant they must be advocated. At supranational level, i.e. as to a regional organisation, these terms carry a different force, as considered here in. Norm agency is usually intended to imply where States act as advocates, non-State organisations act as advocates and international organisations act as norm agents. 7 The EU maybe said to be a rising but complex norm agent because of its porous openness to inter alia external and internal norms and their interaction onwards into EU rules. The active and developing component of this process has the appearance of a manifestation, as a tendency, an incremental process or development. Norms act as a focal point for decentralised networks of organisations and individuals and as a result, International organisations are major promoters of norms in world politics. This paper focusses upon one aspect of the theorisation of sovereignty which is the manner in which norms are promoted by the EU through its participation in the global legal order.
This paper argues that this participation may usefully be captured by sovereignty, as an over-arching framework beyond an analysis for power, influence and interactions between legal orders. It is argued that sovereignty comprises dynamic internal and external interfaces and that it captures the flexible, fluid but also pragmatic way in which the EU gradually asserts itself in the global legal order.
Accordingly, the account unpicks and unravels manifestations of the EU's emerging postnational sovereignty done through a consideration of social practice, active conduct and the space of and for EU rules and their boundaries. forms of law and politics, interactions between legal orders and political disordering.
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Postnationalism is arguably less a study of single or specific instruments or policies and instead is probably more accurately a broader methodology to study shifts in norms, actors and processes.
However, postnationalism has not resulted in any accepted normative idea of postnational 'law' as a phenomenon, especially not in legal scholarship. Nor has it evolved with any express relationship to sovereignty as a construct, method or process of legal orders or ordering. At its height, the deployment of post-nationalism in legal scholarship has even been critiqued as 'EU-centric' and 'Court-centric', thereby lacking relevance to any legal order or field outside of the context of the EU, constructed largely through judicialised understandings of conduct. 12 Postnational conceptualisations of the EU are not perceived to have a broad reach precisely because, as some wryly note, there is no postnational world. 13 Moreover, its inherent direction may become problematic. 
II. The 'useful uselessness' of sovereignty i. Overview
Sovereignty is conducted within a rhetoric that is usually conducted either in terms of negativity, loss, breakdown and reference to the past, 17 or in terms of positivity, which is constructive eg as to sovereignty in conflict, 18 competitive sovereignty, mixed sovereignty or pooled sovereignty. In this way, it offers a parallel to post national rule-making in its emphasis upon disorder but also upon the space of postnational rule-making. The essential incoherence and even uselessness of sovereignty in contemporary legal scholarship is an omnipresent feature, be it in UK Constitutional law, frequently observed, especially across subject disciplines. 20 Similarly, its tendency to raise the rule of recognition 'finders trail' garners it little support. The contestable and 'acriticerial' nature of sovereignty is asserted as both a normative and descriptive standard, yet few accounts of sovereignty may be said to be truly preoccupied with the latter. 21 As a result, sovereignty remains a strikingly malleable 'construct', with broader appeal than its detractors suggest, 22 despite assertions of its demise and futility. It is argued that the meaning of sovereignty is open to change across time and space, more so than ever before. 23 Others depict sovereignty as a common ground where the concerns of lawyers and political scientists can meet. 24 The need for a conceptual framework for sovereignty to settle immediately a series of paradoxes often involving legitimacy and authority makes it no small task. The discursive nature of sovereignty can render it attractive to emergent polities, less so for 'deeper' integration mechanisms.
The classical 'orthodoxy', if one may term it that, is well-put by Loughlin, reminding us that it is a relational interface between law and politics that separates and binds both domains together. 28 The openness of such a construction and its realist acceptance of the complex dual role of the EU alongside its Member States is worth reflecting on.
The sovereign State is self-evidently unlikely to remain the only locus of political authority and community in the future but at the same time it remains a very potent, even tricky, source of authority and community. 29 Nonetheless, there is one particularly valuable feature of sovereignty and that is its ability to form a lexicon for the transition of the world of sovereign states to a world where sovereignty has been relocated in many different levels, above and beyond the Nation State.
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Bellamy's assertion of sovereignty and post-sovereignty as two sides of the one coin are argued to be particularly problematic in so far as he states that post-sovereignty views other forms of sovereignty as a threat to rights. As he states, the EU certainly reflects the positive and negative aspects of the passage from sovereign to post-sovereign (promotion of liberal democracy versus the race to the bottom and/ or legitimacy challenges), as much as an awkward space between them, for example, the limited integration of the EU's AFSJ. However, others contend with some force that the difficulty with post-sovereignty is its blindness to the epistemic as much as the normative role of More significantly, is his acceptance of the possibility to conceive of autonomy without territorial exclusivity. Arguably the most problematic criterion thereof is the 'no way back' element, now defunct after the possibility of withdrawal from the Union being provided for in the Treaties.
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Walker's defence of the precariousness of late sovereignty encompasses conflict and boundary maintenance, diffusion of sovereign power and reflexivity and suggests a high degree of conceptual elasticity. 44 For Walker, however, late sovereignty ultimately permits an organisation to flourish in a broad range of contexts. It offers a wide variety of mechanisms to understand participation in the global legal order.
The present account would readily subscribe to later accounts of MacCormick, particularly on the nature of a kind of compendious legal external sovereignty exercised towards the rest of the world, written before innovations in the EU treaties on legal personality. They nonetheless appear to have featured significantly (implicitly) in his work in terms of their possible legal and political impact. 45 The essence of the attractiveness of the formulation of MacCormick was that sovereignty had never been lost in the process of European integration. Politically, it had enhanced the action of its members collectively and perhaps even individually, in his assessment. Rather the process of division and combination had taken us beyond the sovereign state, albeit well beyond it. 43 Article 50, which was in force at the time of Walker's piece. 44 49 On what is the good life, this account does not purport to advocate the classical political theory interpretation thereof, and instead implies the benefits of EU integration as conceived in the EU treaties, for example in the Preambles to the TFEU and TEU in particular, beyond the goal of the 'ever closer union'.
and postnational democracy, albeit it is not the only premise of a postnational democracy. 50 The same can be said for many places, countries and bodies or regimes predicated upon similar ideals yet which what might be said to fall short of a liberal democracy. 51 More specifically, a central difficulty associated with the development of the EU's AFSJ, its most sensitive and evolving field but also the most closely associated with the Nation State in terms of offering justice, peace, security and overall well-being, is that it has evolved with considerably less coherence than desirable in its efforts to deepen cooperation, substantively and procedurally (e.g., procedural before the substantive, variable geometry, human rights instruments with specific or limited effects). It has occurred in a manner which does not offer its citizens the benefits of a 'good life' overall. The AFSJ has become so contested that its status as a policy field or mode of governance remains a contentious one. 52 There are also many who protest as to its justice deficit but it is never stated to the effect that the 'good life' is jeopardised.
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The development of the AFSJ is a vivid reminder of the limitations of aspirations beyond the Nation State. Also constructions of the good life are too easily premised on the malleable boundaries of EU law. The rule-making toolkit of the EU to act as an innovative organisation are incredibly limited.
Moreover, the construction of competence where it straddles classical internal market law and the AFSJ demonstrates how the EU has yet to carve out a sophisticated rule-making toolkit. ii.
Participation within the global legal order as a social practice
Sovereignty is an inherently social concept in that it entails the recognition by other similar entities that an entity is also 'one of them'. 54 It thus implies a social relationship of formal equality. iii. 66 Young challenges the explicit assumption that the EU always seeks to export or upload EU regulatory solutions globally and instead pursues a more relative regulatory solution overall.
However, as a proposition it requires more nuancing not least from a legal perspective.
It is increasingly common for the EU to harbour 'global governance' goals with its third country partners-for example, the aims of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), aiming for global standards, similar to the EU-US Cybercrime and Security negotiations, also aiming (regulatory) impact of the EU often do appear to overstate its influences, possess different understandings of what is regulatory impact. It also is easy to neglect outlining instances where the EU did not exercise regulatory influence. 68 However, as a broader proposition, the space of EU rules is argued here to require more nuancing, method and study as to its components, especially in the context of the AFSJ. In short there are as many methodological as substantive challenges to such a thesis, which this text has sought to address as part of a research agenda.
This leads to the question of the construction of boundaries and transboundaries, which this paper considers in further detail.
iv. Transboundary control and EU law
While there has been a charted empirical explosion in the late 20 th Century in the number of socalled 'transnational' cases arising, where national laws are applied extra-territorially, to attempt to typologise categories of control as it manifests itself in 'transboundary' action-descriptively or normatively-is a steep challenge. 69 It reflects the enduring relevance of boundaries as interests for political ends. Extra-territorial laws have been argued to be a necessary impetus to spur negotiations and provide incentives to cooperate internationally. 70 In this regard, territoriality and extra-territoriality are and seem likely to remain legal constructs defined traditionally by claims to and resistance from authority. As Buxbaum states, the essence of such claims to authority is that particular actors usually wish to promote specific substantive interests. 71 As a result, practical, but mainly political questions inevitably dominate these constructs.
As Lindahl has argued persuasively, no legal order is in reality thinkable absent boundaries in space, time, subjectivity and content, even if are various forms of 'alegality'. 72 This is because legal boundaries join and separate within the unity of a legal order. 73 This does not necessarily meet the challenge of the postnational level where one witnesses a specific reconfiguration of directions of authority.
The phenomenon of the EU leveraging its rule-making outside of its territory has been depicted variously as 'territory extension' or 'counter-territoriality'. 74 Yet the traditional 'triumvirate' of sovereignty, territory and jurisdiction conventionally used to theorise borders of laws is arguably of little use in the conceptualization of much contemporary conduct of the EU. 75 Instead, the globalised world of trans-boundary conduct and overlapping jurisdiction suggests that these three elements merge more frequently. 76 That EU law should similarly reflect this is not surprising. Moreover, the conduct of the EU externally as a legal actor is not necessarily unitary and instead its actors remain non-unitary. Thus, to assert that the EU acts unilaterally so as to expand its territory has been argued here not to grasp the structural indirectness of the EU's rule-transfer. This point is neatly demonstrated by recalling Scott's argument as to 'Territorial extension' of EU law, 77 who proposes may note how few legal theorisations of the EU develop extra-territoriality or territorial extension from the premise of broader theorisations of conduct and necessity, for example, cosmopolitanism, so as to justify moral, ethnic or other legal duties outside of its territory. 78 From the perspective of sovereignty, there is something unsatisfactory about constructing territorial extension alone as a (quasi)normative standard, if it is that at all, because of the failure to engage with the blurring of sovereignty, authority and territory therein. 
IV. Concluding Reflections: On manifestations of sovereignty

